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Policy recommendations to EU member states
\ Establish a UN-mandated no-fly zone in 
northern Syria
To stop the cycle of mass displacement and attacks 
against civilians, a UN-mandated no-fly zone must be 
established in northern Syria. If a no-fly zone is not 
successful in protecting civilians in northern Syria, a 
UN-mandated safe zone must also be considered and 
ultimately implemented.
\ Extend humanitarian cross-border aid 
(UNSCR 2165) and reopen the al-Yarubiyah 
border crossing
EU member states must call on the UN Security Council 
to vote for continuing humanitarian cross-border aid 
(UNSCR 2165) and to reopen the al-Yarubiyah border 
crossing with Iraq in north-eastern Syria to prevent 
the humanitarian situation from deteriorating further. 
\ Impose a comprehensive arms embargo 
to secondary conflict parties
Suspend the transfer of weapons, ammunition and 
military equipment to secondary conflict parties, such 
as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to stop illegal re-transfers 
to the Syrian war zone. Existing national agreements 
to suspend certain arms exports to Turkey (2019) by 
Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany, as well as the export moratoria 
of limited duration for Saudi Arabia (2018), should be 
extended to a comprehensive, not time-limited EU 
arms embargo.
\ Buy and destroy the still existing stocks 
of former Yugoslav weapons
Many of the weapons that are re-exported to Syria are 
old arms, produced in former Yugoslavian countries or 
the Soviet Union. To date, partially uncontrolled and 
illegal stocks of old arms exist on the Balkans and in 
eastern European states. To prevent further proliferation 
of these weapons to Syria and other war zones, the 
European Commission should set up an initiative to 
buy and destroy these weapons.
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Introduction
The war in Syria, now in its tenth year, has resulted  
in more than 500,000 victims, 6.2 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and 5.7 million refugees.  
11.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assis-
tance. In particular, the current heavy fighting in 
Idlib between the Syrian government, supported by 
Russia, and the oppositional non-state armed groups 
(NSAGs), which are actively backed by Turkey, exacer-
bates the situation for civilians. The region already 
hosted 1.12 million IDPs in November 2019 and saw 
the displacement of another 959,000 IDPs in the first 
three months of 2020, of whom 80 per cent are women 
and children, many of whom remain without shelter. 
This constitutes the largest mass displacement since 
the start of the war in March 2011.
Moreover, the targeted destruction of vital civilian 
and medical infrastructure by the Syrian regime and 
Russia further aggravates the present situation in 
Idlib. According to the Syrian Network for Human 
Rights, 752 attacks on vital civilian infrastructure were 
recorded in 2019 (2020, p. 6). In the light of Russia’s  
recent withdrawal from the UN-run humanitarian 
deconfliction system1 , it will be even harder to hold 
Russia accountable for those attacks which are illegal 
under international humanitarian law. Furthermore, 
the UN-mandated humanitarian cross-border opera-
tion (resolution 2165) expires by 10 July 2020, which 
previously had been renewed annually since 2014. In 
January 2020, however, it was re-authorised for just 
two of the four border crossings (Bab al-Salam and 
Bab al-Hawa in Idlib) for only six months. The 
al-Yarubiyah border crossing in north-eastern Syria 
was closed to humanitarian aid.
To stop the humanitarian disaster and to address the 
pressing needs for civilian protection, this Policy Brief 
suggests four concrete measures for EU member 
states: 
1\ Impose a comprehensive arms embargo to secondary 
conflict parties;  
1 \  Humanitarian deconfliction is, for example,  sharing GPS coordinates of 
hospitals with armed actors.
2\ Buy and destroy the still existing stocks of former 
Yugoslav weapons; 
3\ Establish a UN-mandated no-fly zone in northern 
Syria and
4\ Extend humanitarian cross-border aid (UNSCR 
2165) and reopen the al-Yarubiyah border crossing. 
These four measures must be taken at the same time. 
Stopping the arms flows is important, but without a 
no-fly zone and extended humanitarian aid, the Syrian 
regime could benefit disproportionally, which would 
increase current risks to civilians.
Impose a comprehensive arms embargo 
to secondary conflict parties
When violence in Syria escalated in 2011, all conflict 
parties received arms from abroad. Russia and Iran 
supplied weapons and military equipment to the Syrian 
government forces. Western countries—especially the 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the 
United States—decided to support ‘moderate’ NSAGs 
within Syria. This began with the lifting of the EU 
arms embargo in May 2013 that paved the way for  
further exports of lethal and non-lethal equipment to 
NSAGs on a large scale, besides the arms export of 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar that had already taken place. 
France provided 12.7mm machine guns, rocket 
launchers, night-vision goggles and communication 
systems in 2013 to empower main ‘moderate’ NSAGs 
that had joined together under the label Free Syrian 
Army (FSA). Between 2013 and 2017, the United Kingdom 
delivered non-lethal equipment worth over €38 million 
to the FSA, including communication, medical and 
logistics equipment, body armour, and armoured  
vehicles. From 2015 to January 2018, the Dutch govern-
ment supported NSAGs with non-lethal equipment 
like pick-up trucks, uniforms and laptops worth €70 
million.2  However, Western countries had no agreed 
definition of what constituted a ‘moderate’ and a 
‘radical’ NSAG—some joint agreements evolved 
2 \  The United States announced in June 2013 their CIA vetting process 
‘Timber Sycamore’ for Syrian oppositional NSAGs, although they had 
secretly supported armed groups since 2012. The CIA programme 
included light weapons, military training, salaries and TOW anti-tank 
missiles. It ended in July 2017.
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around the idea that NSAGs must be secular and have 
no ties to ‘terrorist’ groups.3  This lack of clarity resulted 
in direct and indirect arms exports to various NSAGs. 
Also ‘radical’ NSAGs have gained access to Western 
lethal and non-lethal equipment, mainly due to 
changing alliances, joint military operations and the 
merging of ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ NSAGs. At the 
same time, several Gulf countries developed their own 
vetting process, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia prefer-
ring ‘radical’ NSAGs. Consequently, large numbers of 
different weapon systems were delivered to various 
oppositional NSAGs in Syria.
Saudi Arabia, until today, is one of the main backers of 
the insurgency against President Bashar al-Assad as 
it supplies non-state armed groups with money and 
weapons. These weapons consist of a variety of Soviet- 
type weapon systems and equipment from Europe 
and are routed from eastern European and Balkan 
countries—among them Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, 
Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Czech  
Republic (plus Montenegro and Serbia)—to the Arabian 
Peninsula (mostly from Black Sea ports through the 
harbour of Jeddah), and then smuggled into Syria via 
Jordan and Turkey.4  In recent years, thousands of  
assault rifles such as AK-47s, mortar shells, rocket 
launchers, anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns 
have been delivered through this arms pipeline to 
NSAGs. Their fighters are seen with Osa M79 anti-tank 
rockets from Croatia, former Yugoslav six-shot 40mm 
grenade launchers, BM-21 GRAD rocket launchers 
and OT-64 SKOT armoured personnel carriers from 
Bulgaria. 
As already mentioned, European weapons are also in 
the hands of ‘radical’ NSAGs. Ahrar al-Sham, for example, 
received large numbers of AK rifles, PK machine guns, 
RPG-7 rocket launchers, SPG-9 recoilless guns and am-
munition from the old stockpiles of former Yugoslav 
countries. Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS—
both are designated ‘terrorist’ groups by the United 
3 \  The category of ‘terrorist’ group is also not universally defined.
4 \  Belgrade, Sofia, Bratislava and Zagreb serve as the main hubs for airlifts 
of cargo planes, loaded with Yugoslav-era weapons and ammunition, to 
military bases in Saudi Arabia. Arms bought by the Saudis are then re-ex-
ported to two secret command hubs in Turkey and Jordan. Then, they are 
transported by road to the Syrian border or airdropped by military planes.
States due to their alleged linkages to al Qaeda—also 
used weapons produced in the former Yugoslavia, in-
cluding 90mm anti-tank rocket launchers and 82mm 
recoilless guns that have been transferred by Riyadh.
This export policy continues until today. In 2018 and 
2019, the Saudi Ministry of Defence acquired significant 
amounts of Soviet-type weapon systems and equipment, 
for instance from Bulgaria, and has diverted them to 
NSAGs in Syria. Weapon transfers like these are in viola-
tion of the EU Common Position on exports of military 
technology and equipment, which states that no trans-
fers should be approved when there is “the likelihood of 
the military technology or equipment being used other 
than for the legitimate national security and defence of 
the recipient” and when there is a “risk of such technol-
ogy or equipment being diverted to ‘terrorist’ organisa-
tions” (European Union Council, 2019).
Qatar and Turkey have similarly re-exported European 
weapon systems to Syrian NSAGs. Both countries prefer 
to support ‘radical’ NSAGs and thereby consciously sup-
port groups like Ahrar al-Sharqiya, whose fighters are 
mainly former members of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar 
al-Sham. Tonnes of old Warsaw Pact weaponry have 
been delivered from Romania and Bulgaria to military 
facilities in Turkey, including heavy machine guns, rocket 
launchers, mortars, anti-tank guided weapons and 
grenades—weapons that have been used to train ‘moder-
ate’ NSAGs or transferred onto the Syrian battlefield.
Box 1  
NSAG Nour al-Din al-Zenki
Initially, Nour al-Din al-Zenki was a significant part of the Free Syrian 
Army, but formed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; so-called designated 
‘terrorist’ group) together with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (successor of 
Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017. Later Nour al-Din al-Zenki split 
from HTS and joined the National Liberation Front (NLF) (May 
2018). The NLF receives Turkish support, while HTS receives support 
by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This restructuring provided each sub-group 
with access to more funding, training and equipment. This is why 
HTS, is frequently seen with US-made anti-tank guided missiles,  
European assault rifles and Croatian Osa M79, but also with former- 
Yugoslav 40mm grenade launchers and M60 recoilless guns. 
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the illegal arms trade in Europe. To prevent additional 
purchases (e.g. from Serbian and Russian stockpiles), 
an approximate inventory of the old stocks should be 
made beforehand. Interpol estimates that more than 
four million old small arms and light weapons are 
currently stockpiled in the states of the former Yugo-
slavia. EU member states have the possibility to en-
sure that these weapons will not cause more human 
suffering by being transferred onto the Syrian battle-
field or to other violent conflicts.
Establish a UN-mandated no-fly zone 
in northern Syria
Since the Syrian war is still ongoing and civilian suf-
fering during the past months has been worse than 
ever, a UN-mandated no-fly zone is required. A hu-
manitarian crisis of this scale should already have 
galvanised the international community to launch a 
coordinated campaign to end this suffering. But so 
far, regional and global politics have inhibited such 
efforts. Instead, four de-escalation zones in Syria were 
implemented by the active conflict parties Turkey, 
Russia and Iran. However, these zones were not to 
protect civilians, but to allow the regime to reconquer 
territory. The same risk persists with the recent 
agreement between Turkey and Russia on Idlib. To 
prevent the situation from deteriorating further, a 
UN-mandated no-fly zone is necessary. And if the  
humanitarian catastrophe cannot be averted with 
the recommended measures, a UN-mandated safe 
zone must be considered and ultimately implemented.
In addition to the airstrikes, the situation of the civil-
ians is further deteriorating due to the recent inflation 
and shortages in food and medicines. For instance, 
the price of a typical basket of food has increased by 
209 per cent in one year, while 90 per cent of the pop-
ulation are now estimated to live below the poverty 
line. At the same time, anti-regime protests in southern 
Syria have re-emerged. Rising tensions are aggravated 
by new US sanctions through the Caesar Act and  
conflicts within the inner regime circles (falling-out 
between Bashar al-Assad and his cousin, regime tycoon 
Rami Makhlouf) that in turn increase pressure on the 
The Free Idlib Army, for example, received Turkish 
military support, such as Bulgarian GRAD and Croatian 
RAK-12 rocket launchers with which they defended 
themselves against government forces. Ankara has 
also violated end-use monitoring agreements with 
the United States by illegally transferring US-supplied 
weapons and equipment to NSAGs in Syria. According 
to reports, German Leopard 2 tanks may also have 
been passed on to Jaysh al-Islam (dpa, 2019).5 
Since illegal re-exports cannot be ruled out in the 
future, the recently imposed national agreements to 
suspend arms exports to Turkey (2019) by Norway, 
Finland, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom 
and Germany6 , and the export moratoria of limited 
duration for Saudi Arabia (2018) by Finland, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Germany and the Nether-
lands should be extended to a comprehensive EU 
arms embargo. At the same time, eastern European 
countries should tighten their defence export controls. 
In parallel, the European Union should support the new 
US sanctions targeting the regime’s main arms-im-
porting allies Russia and Iran through the Caesar Act.
Buy and destroy the still existing stocks 
of former Yugoslav weapons
Given that many of the weapons being re-exported to 
Syria are old weapons from stocks of former Yugoslav 
countries, the European Commission should launch 
an initiative to buy and destroy these stocks so that 
they are removed from circulation. The Federal Criminal 
Police Office of Germany already suggested a similar 
initiative in 2018 as part of European police coopera-
tion. Germany, in partnership with France and Spain, 
could provide leadership on these efforts within the 
European Commission. Such an initiative would pro-
vide incentives to stop exporting old stocks of weapons 
to conflict actors in the Middle East, while also reducing 
 
5 \  That the Turkish Army is using German Leopard 2 in the fight against 
the Syrian Democratic Forces has been verified. Many of those tanks 
have been destroyed. According to observers, American BGM-71 TOW 
anti-tank guided missiles which were delivered to a large number of 
Syrian NSAGs, were used in these attacks.
6 \  The German stop of arms exports to Turkey only includes weapon sys-
tems that could be used in north-eastern Syria. As a result, extensive 
deliveries of other German weapon systems continue until today.
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used as a weapon of war (surrender or starve). With the 
threatened non-extension of the two border crossings 
that actually should enable humanitarian aid to 
non-governmental areas, they cut a vital lifeline that is 
crucial for the civilian population and hence intend to 
influence the further course of the war. The fact that in 
March 2020 1,486 trucks with humanitarian aid were 
sent to Syria via the border crossings of Bab al-Hawa 
and Bab al-Salam, which is the highest number since 
the implementation of UNSCR 2165, strongly empha-
sises the major significance of cross-border operations. 
Therefore, EU member states must support France and 
the United Kingdom in pushing for a UN Security 
Council vote for this operation to continue with the 
aim to sustainably guarantee humanitarian access to 
the affected population in the governorate of Idlib. 
Russia justified the closure of the al-Yarubiyah border 
crossing in north-eastern Syria on the border with Iraq 
by stating that the required humanitarian assistance 
has long been coming from Syria itself, not from Iraq. 
However, “no road convoys carrying medical items 
went from Damascus to the north-east in 2019” (United 
Nations Security Council, 2020, p. 7). Thus, the lack of 
access to medical equipment further aggravates the 
situation. Accordingly, the European Union must also 
urgently demand a reopening of the al-Yarubiyah 
border crossing to meet the humanitarian needs of the 
1.9 million people in north-east Syria.
Syrian regime and its allies to ultimately compromise 
on a UN-mandated no-fly zone. Therefore, in line 
with the United Nation's call for a global ceasefire 
and UN Special Envoy Geir Pederson’s efforts to im-
plement ceasefires in Syria, France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States should seize this moment to 
negotiate such a no-fly zone. 
To ensure the protection of civilians, to halt the  
destruction of civil and medical infrastructure by the 
regime’s and Russia’s bombing of Idlib, a neutral 
third party like the United Nations must be included.
To maintain neutrality, the United Nations must call 
on troops from countries that are not involved in the 
conflict or that have direct interests in Syria (Khatib, 
2020). This means that Russia and Turkey as active 
conflict parties must be excluded. However, when im-
plementing a no-fly zone, implementing actors must 
also be aware that civilians living outside that zone 
enjoy less protection. Despite questions of detail in 
the design of a no-fly zone, the current situation in 
Syria shows that a concerted response of EU member 
states is highly necessary and should prioritise the 
protection of civilians.
Extend humanitarian cross-border aid 
(UNSCR 2165) and reopen  
the al-Yarubiyah border crossing 
The humanitarian cross-border operation expires by  
10 July. Originally, the humanitarian cross-border  
operation (UNSCR 2165) was implemented in 2014 after 
the Syrian government had obstructed humanitarian 
access to areas outside its control through administra-
tive hurdles and access refusal for deliveries and staff 
for more than three years. Therefore, to guarantee access 
to these areas, NGOs have implemented cross-border 
operations from Turkey, Iraq and Jordan without the 
need to ask the Syrian government for permission. 
However, UNSCR 2165 on cross-border operations was 
re-authorised in January 2020 for two of the four border 
crossings (Bab al-Salam and Bab al-Hawa in Idlib) and 
only for six months. Russia's veto on the extension of 
the four border crossings-operation strongly empha-
sizes that humanitarian aid is highly politicised and 
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